We present a compositional network proof theory to specify and verify safety properties of fault tolerant distributed systems. We abstract from the precise nature and occurrence of faults, but model their e ect on the externally visible input and output behaviour. To this end a failure hypothesis is formalized as a relation between the normal behaviour (i.e. the behaviour when no faults occur) of a system and its acceptable behaviour, that is, the normal behaviour together with the exceptional behaviour (i.e. the behaviour whose abnormality should be tolerated). The method is compositional to allow reasoning with the speci cations of processes while ignoring their implementation details. A compositional formalism to reason about the normal behaviour is extended with a single rule by which a speci cation of the acceptable behaviour can be obtained from the speci cation of the normal behaviour and a predicate characterizing the failure hypothesis. Soundness and relative network completeness are proved. Our approach is illustrated by applying it to a triple modular redundant system and the alternating bit protocol.
Introduction
It is di cult to prove the properties of a distributed system composed of failure prone processes, as such proofs must take into account the e ects of faults occurring at any point in the execution of the individual processes. In the Hoare style formalism of 7] Cristian deals with the e ects of faults that have occurred by partitioning the initial state space into disjoint subspaces, and providing a separate speci cation for each part. In the formalisms that have been proposed in the more recent literature to deal with the occurrence of faults during execution (cf. 5, 12, 13, 17, 20, 27] ) the occurrence of a fault is modeled explicitly. In contrast, we want to model the e ects of faults on the externally visible input and output behaviour and let the syntactic interface of a process remain unchanged. For instance, we do not separate the observable actions generated by the regular execution of the program from those that are attributed to faults. The incorporation of a recovery algorithm into a program has been investigated in 16, 19] . There, the occurrence of a fault is again modeled explicitly and causes the program to enter an erroneous state. Once in an erroneous state the program may exhibit arbitrary behaviour and this distinction su ces in case of recovery. To allow a general treatment of paradigms for fault tolerance 22] we prefer to reason with more nuance about the e ects of faults.
To support top-down program design we wish to reason with the speci cations of processes without considering their implementation and the precise nature and occurrence of faults in such an implementation. This means that we aim at a compositional proof theory for fault tolerant distributed systems.
In particular, we focus on the formalization of fault tolerance in relation to concurrency. Therefore, we abstract from the internal states of processes and concentrate on the input and output behaviour that is observable at their interface. Especially, we only describe the sequence of communications that are performed by the processes. We do not consider the timing of those communications and the enabledness of a process to communicate (so we do not reason about deadlock). In our proof theory we do not deal with the sequential aspects of processes and instead use a simple compositional formalism to verify properties of networks of processes.
Our framework is restricted to the speci cation and veri cation of safety properties of fault tolerant distributed systems. Safety properties are important for reliability because, in the characterization by Lamport 14] , they express that`nothing bad will happen'. Consider, for instance, a simple 1-place rst-in rst-out bu er B that has two observable channels in and out, with the obvious interpretation. Typical safety properties of B are`if there is a communication on out then the communicated value is equal to the most recently communicated value on in' and`the number of out communications is equal to or one less than the number of in communications'. Since we abstract from the sequential details of programs, termination and divergence are not observable in our framework. Because we do not consider liveness properties, no fairness assumptions are needed.
In fault tolerant systems, three forms of behaviour are distinguished: normal, exceptional and catastrophic 15]. Normal behaviour is the behaviour when no faults occur. The discriminating factor between exceptional and catastrophic behaviour is the failure hypothesis which stipulates how faults a ect the normal behaviour. Relative to the failure hypothesis an exceptional behaviour exhibits an abnormality which should be tolerated. A catastrophic behaviour has an abnormality that was not anticipated (cf. 2, 15, 21] ). In general, the catastrophic behaviour of a component cannot be tolerated by a system. Under a particular failure hypothesis for each of its components, a system is designed to tolerate (only) the anticipated component failures (see, e.g., 22] for some design examples). The exceptional behaviour together with the normal behaviour constitutes the acceptable behaviour.
Given this classi cation of behaviour, we investigate whether an existing compositional proof theory for reasoning about the normal behaviour of a system can be adapted to deal with its acceptable behaviour. To do so, we formalize a failure hypothesis as a relation between the normal and the acceptable behaviour of a system. Indeed, such a relation enables one to abstract from the precise nature and occurrence of a fault and to focus on any abnormal behaviour it causes. It is important to note that our goal is to examine whether it is possible to develop a compositional proof theory based on the idea of transforming behaviours; for the time being it is not our aim to nd a logic to express failure hypotheses as elegantly as possible.
We consider networks of processes that communicate synchronously via directed channels. Processes do not share variables. We express a property of a process P by means of a rst order trace logic, using a special variable h to denote the trace, also called history, of P. Such a history describes the observable behaviour of a process by recording the communications along the visible channels of the process. For instance, a possible history of bu er B is h(in; 1); (out; 1); (in; 3); (out; 3)i. To express that a process P satis es a safety property we use a correctness formula of the form P sat .
Based on a particular failure hypothesis, the set of behaviours that characterize a process is expanded.
To keep such an expansion manageable, the failure hypothesis of a process P is formalized as a predicate, whose only free variables are h and h old , which represents a relation between the normal and acceptable histories of P. The interpretation is such that h old represents a normal history of process P, whereas h is an acceptable history of P with respect to the failure hypothesis under discussion. For a predicate representing a failure hypothesis, we introduce the construct P o to indicate execution of process P under the assumption of . This construct enables one to specify failure prone processes. Consider again bu er B. Under the hypothesis that, due to faults, values in the bu er are corrupted, which is formalized by some failure hypothesis predicate Cor, the history h(in; 1); (out; 1); (in; 3); (out; 3)i may be transformed into the history h(in; 1); (out; 1); (in; 3); (out; 5)i. Then, we would like to prove that failure prone process BoCor still satis es the property that`the number of out communications is equal to or one less than the number of in communications'.
We de ne the trace semantics of a failure prone process FP, and de ne when correctness formulae of the form FP sat are valid. We present a proof theory to verify that a system tolerates the exceptional behaviour of its components to the desired extent. The proof theory is compositional in the sense that it allows reasoning with the speci cations satis ed by failure prone processes while ignoring their implementation details. Further, our approach supports a modular treatment of normal and acceptable behaviour. The usefulness of our method is illustrated by applying it to a triple modular redundant system and the alternating bit protocol, where, indeed, we only use the speci cations of the components. Finally, we show that our proof theory is sound and obtain a completeness result by establishing preciseness preservation 28]. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of computation. In Section 3 we present the assertion language and associated correctness formulae. In Section 4 we incorporate failure hypotheses into our formalism. Section 5 presents a compositional network proof theory for fault tolerant distributed systems. We illustrate our method by applying it, in Section 6, to a triple modular redundant system, and, in Section 7, to the alternating bit protocol. In Section 8 we prove that the proof theory of Section 5 is sound and complete. A conclusion and suggestions for future research can be found in Section 9. An extended abstract of this paper appeared in 25].
Model of Computation
Let VAR be a nonempty set of program variables, CHAN a nonempty set of channel names, and let VAL be a denumerable domain of values. II N denotes the set of natural numbers (including 0). We assume a programming language, such as CSP 9] or occam 11], which can be used to de ne networks of processes that communicate synchronously via directed channels. Besides sequential constructs, this language includes the construct P 1 k P 2 to indicate parallel execution of processes P 1 and P 2 , as well as the construct P ncset to hide the channels from a set cset of internal channels.
De ne var(P ) as the set of variables occurring in process P. We do not allow parallel processes to share program variables.
For P 1 kP 2 we require that var(P 1 ) \ var(P 2 ) = .
The set of visible, or observable, input channels of process P, notation in(P ), can be de ned for sequential constructs. Then, in(P 1 k P 2 ) = in(P 1 ) in(P 2 ) and in(P ncset) = in(P ) ? cset. The set out(P ) of observable output channels of process P is de ned likewise.
De nition 1 (Observable channels of a process) The set of observable channels of a process P, notation chan(P ), is de ned by chan(P ) = in(P ) out(P ).
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To guarantee that channels are unidirectional and point-to-point, we have the following syntactic constraint:
For P 1 kP 2 we require that in(P 1 ) \ in(P 2 ) = and out(P 1 ) \ out(P 2 ) = .
To guarantee that only internal channels are hidden:
For P ncset we require that cset in(P ) \ out(P ). We represent a synchronous communication of value 2 VAL along channel c 2 CHAN by a record (c; ), and de ne ch((c; )) = c and val((c; )) = . To denote the behaviour of a process P we use a history which is a nite sequence (also called a trace) of the form h(c 1 ; 1 ); : : : ; (c n ; n )i of length len( ) = n, where n 2 II N, c i 2 chan(P ), and i 2 VAL, for 1 i n. Such a history denotes the communications of P along its observable channels up to some point in an execution. Let hi denote the empty trace, i.e. the sequence of length 0. The concatenation of two traces 1 = h(c 1 ; 1 ); : : : ; (c k 
A set of traces is pre x closed if every pre x of a trace in the set is also an element of that set. For a process P de ned using a programming language in which processes communicate synchronously via directed channels it is quite standard, using the above de ned operations, to give the pre x closed set H P] ] of possible nite traces that can be observed up to any point in an execution of P (see for instance 26, 29] 3 Assertion Language and Correctness Formulae
As mentioned before, we use a correctness formula P sat to express that process P satis es safety property . Informally, since we abstract from the internal states of the processes and focus on the pattern of communications, such a correctness formula expresses that any sequence of communications P may exhibit satis es .
Similar to the semantic denotation of traces in the previous section, we use communication record expressions such as (c; ), with c 2 CHAN and 2 VAL, in assertions. We have channel expressions, e.g. using the operator ch which yields the channel of a communication record, and value expressions, including the operator val which yields the value of a communication record and the length operator len. Further, we use in assertions the empty trace, hi, traces of one record, e.g. h(c; )i, as well as the concatenation operator^and the projection operator ". To refer to the communication history of a process we use a special variable h. For instance, a process which outputs value 2 along channel c satis es the assertion h"fcg = hi _ h"fcg = h(c; 2)i. To reason about natural numbers, the assertion language includes, for value expression vexp, the predicate vexp 2 II N which is true if, and only if, the value of vexp is a natural number. Henceforth we use variables i; j; k; l; n that range over II N. We use, for instance, 8i : as an abbreviation of 8i : i 2 II N ! . Let VVAR, with typical representative v, denote the set of logical value variables ranging over VAL, and let TVAR, with characteristic element t, be the set of logical trace variables ranging over TRACE. Assume that VVAR \ TVAR = . Table 1 presents the assertion language, with c 2 CHAN , 2 VAL, v 2 VVAR, t 2 TVAR, and cset CHAN . Observe that an expression in the assertion language of Table 1 does not refer to program variables since we abstract from the internal state of a process in this paper. This expresses that trace texp 1 is a pre x of trace texp 2 . texp 1 n texp 2 9t : len(t) n^texp 1^t = texp 2 To assert that trace texp 1 is a pre x of trace texp 2 which is at most n records shorter. 
For an assertion we de ne the set chan( ) of channels such that c 2 chan( ) if, and only if, a communication along c might a ect the validity of . For instance, the validity of assertion h = hi is a ected by any communication and thus we should have chan(h = hi) = CHAN . On the other hand, the validity of assertion (h"fcg)^(d; 7) = h(d; 7)i can only be changed by a communication along channel c, although d also occurs in the assertion. Hence, chan( ) consists of the channels to which references to h in are restricted rather than the channels occurring syntactically in (cf. 10, 29] ). Note that the value of a logical variable is not a ected by any communication.
De nition 10 (Channels in an assertion) For an assertion we inductively de ne the set chan( ) as the smallest set of channels such that the validity of may only be a ected by communications on the channels of chan( ). We only give the most interesting cases of this de nition; the rest can easily be de ned by structural induction (see 26]). 
By not specifying the value part of an out record in h, allowing it to be any element of VAL, we can formalize corruption.
Example 3 (Corruption) We formalize corruption as follows:
Cor len(h old "fin; outg) = len(h"fin; outg) 8i : 1 i len(h"fin; outg) ! ch(h"fin; outg(i)) = ch(h old "fin; outg(i)) 8i : Using P to denote a process expressed in the programming language mentioned in Section 2, we de ne the syntax of our extended programming language in Table 2 . 
A Compositional Network Proof Theory
In this section we present a compositional proof theory to prove safety properties of networks of processes. Since we focus on the relation between fault tolerance and concurrency, we have abstracted from the internal states of the processes and do not give rules for atomic statements, nor sequential composition. Such rules could be formulated by using an extended assertion language which includes program variables and a denotation to indicate termination (e.g. 29] h"fm in ; m out g t"fm in ; m out g^h"m in = t"m in Now, for instance, by h"fm in ; m out g t"fm in ; m out g, we have, obviously, h"m out t"m out , which, since Val(t"m out ) 1 
Each component alternately awaits an input message from in, performs some computation f, and produces an output message on out. We abstract from the implementation details of a component; we only consider the following speci cation.
The voter awaits the output of each of the 3 components, takes a majority vote, and outputs the result of that vote. Formally, Voter sat 8i; v : out(i) = v $ (9k 6 = l : out k (i) = out l (i) = v) Finally, component In conforms to In sat 8i; j : in j (i) = in (i) The voter produces the desired output if at least two of the values output by C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 are correct. Hence, to mask the failure of one component, at most one of the values output by C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 may be corrupted for each vote. This assumption is formalized by the following failure hypothesis. (i) h"fin 1 ; in 2 ; in 3 g = h old "fin 1 ; in 2 ; in 3 g We show that, given this assumption, the system Ink( (C 1 kC 2 kC 3 
h"fin 1 ; in 2 ; in 3 g = t"fin 1 ; in 2 ; in 3 g Using h"fin 1 ; in 2 ; in 3 g = t"fin 1 ; in 2 ; in 3 g, we have that V 3 j=1 8i : t"in j (i) = h"in j (i) . Hence (C 1 kC 2 kC 3 )oCor Figure 2 , where A and M are media with failure hypothesis Loss as already discussed in Example 5. Sender S accepts via in data from the environment, appends a bit to it, and sends it via m in ; the value of the bit alternates for successive messages, starting with 1. Receiver R awaits a message via m out , and sends the bit via a in as an acknowledgement; R only passes the data via out to the environment if the value of the message's bit di ers from the value of the previous message's bit, or if it is the rst message. Thus, messages along M consist of data-bit pairs (d; b), and we de ne dat ((d; b) In the sequel we write h where we mean h"chan(ABP). The informal description of sender S given above can be formalized as follows.
S sat Dat(RDMsg(h"m in 
Similarly, we obtain the following speci cation for receiver R.
R sat
Val(h"out) 1 Dat(RDMsg(h"m out )) Val(RDAck(h"a in )) 1 Bit(RDMsg(h"m out )) Then, by (Consequence) and (Parallel composition), we obtain:
ABP sat Val(RDAck(h"a in 
For medium A we obtain similarly ABP sat len(RDAck(h"a out )) len(RDAck(h"a in ))
(A8) The crucial property of the alternating bit protocol is the following. Lemma 7 (Persistency) ABP sat
Proof. See Appendix C.
Then, by (Consequence), we have ABP sat Dat(RDMsg(h"m out 
which, by (A1) and (A3), yields ABP sat Val(h"out) Val(h"in) which shows that the alternating bit protocol tolerates loss of messages and acknowledgements.
Soundness and Relative Network Completeness
In this section we prove that the proof theory of Section 5 is sound; that is, we prove that, if a correctness formula FP sat is derivable, then it is valid. Furthermore, we prove the proof system to be complete; that is, we prove that, if a correctness formula FP sat is valid, then it is derivable. Theorem 1 (Soundness) The proof system of Section 5 is sound.
Proof. See Appendix D.
As usual when proving completeness, we assume that we can prove any valid formula of the underlying (trace) logic (cf. 6]). Thus, using` to denote that assertion is derivable, we add the following axiom to our proof theory. (iii) chan( ) chan(FP).
3
As in 28], we use the preciseness preservation property to achieve relative completeness. The intuition is that, as long as the speci cations of the individual processes are precise, so are the deduced speci cations of systems composed of such processes.
Let`P sat denote that correctness formula P sat is derivable. Note that no proof rules were given for the sequential aspects of processes, so our notion of completeness is relative to the assumption that for a process P there exists a precise assertion . This leads to the de nition of network completeness.
De nition 22 (Network completeness) Assume that for every process P there exists a precise assertion with`P sat . Then, for any failure prone process FP and assertion , j = FP sat implies FP sat . 3
The following lemma asserts that preciseness is preserved by the proof rules of Section 5.
Lemma 8 (Preciseness preservation) Assume that for any process P there exists an assertion which is precise for P and`P sat . Then, for any failure prone process FP there exists an assertion which is precise for FP and`FP sat . Proof. See Appendix E.
The following lemma asserts that any speci cation satis ed by a failure prone process is implied by the precise speci cation of that process. Since a precise speci cation only refers to channels of the process, and a valid speci cation might refer to other channels, we have to add a clause expressing that the process does not communicate on those other channels.
Lemma 9 (Preciseness consequence) If is precise for FP and j = FP sat then j = ( ^h"(chan( ) ? chan(FP)) = hi) ! Proof. Assume that is precise for FP, and that j = FP sat (1) .
Consider any and . Assume that ( ; ) j = ^h"(chan( ) ? chan(FP)) = hi (2) .
By (2) By (2), we have that ( ; ) j = h"(chan( ) ? chan(FP)) = hi. Hence, "(chan( ) ? chan(FP)) = hi, and thus, "chan(FP) = "(chan(FP) (chan( ) ? chan(FP))) = "(chan(FP) chan( )). Hence, we obtain from (3) that ( "(chan(FP) chan( )); ) j = , and consequently, by projection lemma (a), ( ; ) j = .
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Now we can establish relative network completeness.
Theorem 2 (Relative network completeness) The proof system of Section 5 is relatively network complete.
Proof. Assume that for every process P there exists a precise speci cation with`P sat . Then, by the preciseness preservation lemma, for any failure prone process FP there exists an assertion which is precise for FP and`FP sat (1) .
Assume j = FP sat . Since (chan( ) ? chan(FP)) \ chan(FP) = , we obtain, by (Invariance), FP sat h"(chan( ) ? chan(FP)) = hi (2) .
By (1) and (2),`FP sat ^h"(chan( )?chan(FP)) = hi, and thus, by the preciseness consequence lemma, the relative completeness assumption, and (Consequence),`FP sat . 2 
Conclusions and Future Research
We have de ned a trace-based compositional proof theory for fault tolerant distributed systems. In this theory, the failure hypothesis of a process is formalized as a relation between the normal and acceptable observable input and output behaviour of that process. Such a relation enables one to abstract from the precise nature of a fault and to focus on the abnormal behaviour it causes. Comparing our proof system with trace-based formalisms for normal behaviour (see e.g. 29]), only one new rule, viz. the failure hypothesis introduction rule, has been added to capture acceptable executions. We illustrated our method by proving safety of a triple modular redundant system and the alternating bit protocol, using only the speci cations of the components. The proof of correctness of the alternating bit protocol that appears in 18] is also based on traces. There, a less natural speci cation of the receiver, which contains the requirement that non-duplicate input messages have alternating bits, evades the necessity to prove the property of persistency. In this paper we only considered safety properties, ignoring liveness issues. Since the underlying trace logic is based on nite approximations, the proof theory we presented is not appropriate to deal with liveness properties. To allow reasoning about liveness properties, trace logic can be replaced by a more expressive logic, e.g. temporal logic. Then, instead of relating normal and exceptional communication sequences, a failure hypothesis relates normal and exceptional sequences of states. Consider, for instance, a system S whose state consists of 2 integers x and y, that is, STATE S = f j : fx; yg ! II N g.
Assume that in a sequence s of states a new state is recorded whenever the value of x or y changes. If we allow transient memory faults to occur, then it is possible that, instead of some intended sequence s old = (0; 0); (10; 0); : : :, we observe s = (0; 0); (3; 0); (10; 0); : : : because a fault a ects the cell containing x before it is assigned the value 10. Notice that, since we only allow transient memory faults, assigning 10 to x undoes the e ect of the preceding fault. In a description where each new state is related to its predecessor by stating which state variables have changed, transient memory faults can easily be formalized as the insertion of a state at an arbitrary position in the sequence.
Finding a logic to express failure hypotheses more elegantly, e.g. using the classi cation of failures that appears in 8], is a subject of future investigation. Another continuation of the research described in this paper is the introduction of time to the formalism, to allow reasoning about properties of fault tolerant real-time distributed systems. This is investigated in 24] where the nite trace model is replaced by a model in which timed in nite traces are decorated with timed refusal sets. The extended model enables deadlock to be taken into account. Also, since it consists of in nite observations, it allows liveness and fairness issues to be considered. Four cases need examination:
Assume that len(RDAck(t"a out )) = len(RDAck (t"a in ) ). Then, since h = t^ (a out ; b) , where b 6 = val(last(t"a out )), we obtain len(RDAck(h"a out )) = len(RDAck(h"a in )) + 1, which conicts with (A7). Consequently, by (14) , len(RDAck(t"a out )) < 1 len(RDAck(t"a in )), which, combined with (1), yields Val(RDAck(t"a out )) 1 Val(RDAck(t"a in ) 
